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SANITARY SEWER OVERFLOWS: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Sanitary sewers are an overlooked part of the nation's infrastructure.'
Most Americans never think twice about what happens to the water that runs
down the drain.2 The public eye turns to sanitary sewers only when untreated
waste overflows into the surrounding environment. The image of sanitary
sewer overflows ("SSOs") into ambient surface waters or basements is not a
pleasant one, but how difficult is it to prevent such an overflow? What level
of regulation is appropriate to effectively spur sewer owners, mainly
municipalities, to eliminate overflows?
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is currently
in the process of promulgating a new rule that will govern the regulation of
SSOs ("Proposed Rule").3 This Comment argues that the EPA's new rule will
not be effective for two main reasons: (1) The new rule will not remedy the
current nebulous situation of ad hoc, uneven administration by the EPA and
the various responsible state agencies; (2) The new rule's broad exceptions
will allow too many preventable SSOs to go unpunished. Further, this
Comment proposes a single modification to the Proposed Rule that would
increase the uniformity and enforceability of this area of the law by linking
regulators' decisions on whether to prosecute the most common SSO
violations-those induced by wet weather-to the intensity of the wet-
1. The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") estimates that sanitary sewage
collection and treatment systems comprise ten to fifteen percent of the total value of the United
States infrastructure. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit
Requirements for Municipal Sanitary Sewer Collection Systems, Municipal Satellite Collection
Systems, and Sanitary Sewer Overflows (proposed Jan. 4, 2001) (withdrawn Jan. 20, 2001) (awaiting
re-publication in Fed. Reg.) at 25, available at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/regresult.cfm?program-id=4&view=all&type=3 (last updated Aug. 13,
2003) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
2. As a civil engineer, the author of this Comment deals with issues of sewer capacity (or lack
thereof) on a near-daily basis. He has advised municipalities of their obligations triggered by permits
issued under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). He has conducted several sanitary sewer capacity
studies for local municipalities. He has overseen the installation and operation of flow monitoring
equipment in sanitary sewers, evaluated and interpreted the data collected from this equipment, and
written the resulting technical reports. He has witnessed firsthand the increased flows in sanitary
sewers because of extreme rainfall events and has participated in engineering projects undertaken
with the sole purpose of reducing or eliminating storm water infiltration and inflow to sanitary
sewers.
3. See Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 1.
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weather event that caused the SSO.
The SSO problem is not new. During the environmentally conscious
1970s, Congress attempted to attack the SSO problem by enacting the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (now known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA")).4
In effect, Section 301 of the CWA completely prohibited SSOs. 5 Congress
entrusted the duty of enforcing this prohibition to the newly created EPA.6
Under the permit issuing system of the CWA, however, the EPA's highly
7discretionary enforcement of the prohibition was uneven.
Environmental watchdog groups helped change the erratic results of EPA
enforcement by prodding overwhelmed government agencies into action.8
Today, many communities, feeling the sting of enforcement actions to the
tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, are finding that the problem of SSOs
cannot be overlooked any longer.
9
One example of this trend toward community involvement is the city of
Cincinnati, Ohio, which recently signed a consent decree with the EPA to
address its SSO problem.' ° The Sierra Club" challenged the consent decree
in federal court on the grounds that the decree was not ambitious enough. No
one could positively determine how much it would cost to implement all the
repairs mandated by the Cincinnati consent decree. The Sierra Club estimated
the amount at one billion dollars. 12 City authorities disagreed, but admitted
that the first phase of repairs alone would cost seventy-four million dollars. 3
This Comment addresses the past, present, and future of SSO regulation in
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
5. See id. § 1311 (a).
6. Id. § 1251(d).
7. See infra Part II1.
8. See, e.g., Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund v. City of Atlanta, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1380
(N.D. Ga. 2000); Save Our Bays & Beaches v. City & County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (D.
Haw. 1994); Bonnot v. City of Jefferson City, 791 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
9. See, e.g., Interim Partial Consent Decree on Sanitary Sewer Overflows, 67 Fed. Reg. 9320
(Feb. 28, 2002) (between the United States of America and the City of Cincinnati) [hereinafter
Consent Decree].
10. Id.
11. The Sierra Club is "America's oldest, largest and most influential grassroots environmental
organization," boasting over 700,000 members. http://www.sierraclub.org (last visited June 29,
2003). The Club maintains chapters in all fifty states. Id. The Club also has been the plaintiff in
thousands of lawsuits seeking to protect the environment. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra
Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998); Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 522 U.S. 1089 (1998); Cedar Point
Oil Co. v. Sierra Club, 519 U.S. 811 (1996).
12. Craig Garretson, Sewer Cleanup Facing Challenge, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 27, 2002,
available at http://www.cincypost.com/2002/feb/27/sewerO22702.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2003).
13. Fixing Sewers Would Raise Rates 6%, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 12, 2002, available at




the United States. It applies the EPA's Proposed Rule to the Cincinnati case
study, explains why the EPA's rule is inadequate, and concludes with a
proposal to improve it. Part II of this Comment provides a general
introduction to SSOs and describes the history of the SSO problem in the
United States. Part III explains the current regulatory scheme employed by
the EPA and responsible state agencies and how courts have addressed the
SSO issue in the relevant case law. This Part illustrates the inadequacy of the
current regulatory environment, including the problems of contested
enforceability decisions and uneven enforcement. It also shows how the EPA
is sometimes overwhelmed by the scope of the problem. Part IV examines the
proposed SSO rule promulgated by the EPA in 2001.14 As demonstrated in
Part III, an update to the regulatory scheme is sorely needed; however, the
rule originally proposed by the EPA does not do enough to remedy the
problem because it does not specifically address SSOs caused by wet weather.
Part V examines Cincinnati, Ohio as a case study, which recently entered into
a consent decree that could result in hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
repairs to the city's sewer system.15  Part V also shows how the current
regulatory scheme has made Cincinnati's problem into a disaster far worse
than it had to be and how the EPA's proposed regulatory scheme would not
have improved the situation. Part VI suggests a single modification to the
proposed regulatory framework-the addition of a standard permit condition
that would tie the enforcement of SSOs caused by wet weather to the SSOs
caused by the intensity of the rainfall. Part VI also suggests that this single
modification would make uniform and fair enforcement easier and, if utilized,
would have led to a smoother resolution of the Cincinnati controversy.
II. SSOs: PAST AND PRESENT
Since the dawn of civilization, humans have grappled with the intensely
practical problem of waste disposal.16 Over the past few centuries, engineers
14. Later, the EPA withdrew the Proposed Rule to allow then recently elected President Bush's
new EPA Administrator to examine it. At the time of the Rule's withdrawal, the EPA stated that it
expected to re-promulgate it in 2003 with identical "regulatory language." United States EPA,
Sanitary Sewer Overflows-Current Regulatory Framework and Proposed Rule, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/sso/ssorule.cfm?program id=4 (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). Currently,
though, the EPA has removed any reference to an expected date of re-promulgation and merely states
that the proposal is under review. Id.
15. See infra Part V. The local chapter of the Sierra Club has filed a lawsuit challenging the
consent decree as insufficiently aggressive, a development that illustrates the vast discrepancies in
how different parties view the SSO problem. Dan Horn, Sierra Clubfiles suit against Hamilton Co.,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/02/28/locsierra-club files.html.
16. See, e.g., Edwin Chadwick, Report... from the Poor Law Commissioners on an Inquiry
2003]
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have developed sewer systems designed to transport sanitary sewage from
individual homes to centralized treatment plants.17 However, modem systems
have also brought modem problems caused by deviations from normal
operating conditions.I
8
A. Development of Sewer Systems and Transition to Separated Sewers
Civilization took a giant step forward with the development of sewer
systems, which are often credited with great reductions in the spread of
communicable diseases.' 9 Originally, engineers designed sewer systems to
convey both sanitary sewage and storm water runoff and to discharge into
receiving waters without any treatment.20 As science in the area developed,
the dangers posed by such an approach became evident. 2' Treatment of the
waste therefore was desired.
Engineers correctly realized that treatment of storm water flows was both
unnecessary (because storm water is much cleaner than sanitary sewage) and
cost-prohibitive (because storm water is much greater in quantity than sanitary
sewage). Therefore, in most areas, engineers abandoned the combined storm
and sanitary sewer approach.22 In older parts of some major cities, though,
combined sewers are still in use.23
Since its creation in 1970, the EPA has sometimes required communities
to "separate" combined sewers-to route sanitary and storm flows in separate
channels-in order to resolve persistent sanitary overflow problems by
removing much larger storm flows from the sanitary sewers. 24 These EPA-
into the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain (1842), available at
http://65.107.211.206/victorian/history/chadwick2.html (last visited June 28, 2003).
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 16; Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 15, 19.
20. See, e.g., http://www.cleanstreams.org/overview.htm (discussing the development of the
sewer system in Atlanta, Georgia) (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
21. See id.
22. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 16.
23. In the older districts of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, combined sewers are still in use. In
Milwaukee, combined sewer overflows ("CSO") are a far worse problem than separated sanitary
sewer overflows. See Sewage was Dumped in Lincoln Creek, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL,
Aug. 16, 2002, at A2. For a detailed analysis of the combined sewer overflow problem and the
EPA's response, see Kevin B. Smith, Combined Sewer Overflows and Sanitary Sewer Overflows:
EPA 's Regulatory Approach and Policy Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 26 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10296 (1996). This Comment proposes that the EPA should tie its evaluation of a wet-
weather induced SSO to the intensity of the rainfall event that caused it. This suggestion would be
equally applicable to the enforcement decisions made by the EPA in response to CSO occurrences,
although the intensity of the rainfall event that would cause an "allowable" CSO would likely differ
from the "allowable" SSO-causing rainfall intensity.
24. See, e.g., Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. 1998); In re Authorization
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commanded sewer separation projects have been judicially enforced by the
courts, even at great expense to municipalities.25
Today, both engineers and regulators embrace the concept of separated
sewers: One system of "storm sewer[s]" is designed to convey only storm
water flow and discharge it, untreated, to receiving waters, while the other
system of "sanitary sewers" is designed to convey only sanitary waste directly
to a treatment facility where the waste is treated.26 The treated waste stream,
called "effluent," is then discharged into receiving waters. When the system
works as planned, it stays far below the radar of public notice. However,
when problems occur, sanitary sewers are forced into the public
27consciousness in unanticipated ways.
B. Deviation from Normal Operation-Backups and Overflows
Deviations from normal operating conditions can cause problems in the
treatment cycle. The most frequent occurrence adversely affecting the
operation of a municipality's sanitary sewer system is a severe rain event.
28
The sanitary sewer is designed to convey only sanitary waste, not storm
water.29 Inevitably, though, some storm water gains entrance to the sanitary
sewers. 30  This penetration can occur through direct connections to the
sanitary sewer by roof drains and sump pumps, through holes in sanitary
manhole covers, through cracks in the pipes, or through many other
unforeseen defects.3'
During the design of sanitary sewers, engineers make minimal allowances
for this inevitable inflow and infiltration of storm water. However, when
large amounts of storm water enter the sanitary sewer, backups occur because
the pipes cannot convey larger amounts of flow adequately.32 In turn, these
to Discharge and Construct Wastewater Treatment Facilities, 366 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
25. See, e.g., State v. City of Allen Park, 573 F. Supp. 1481, 1486 (C.D. Mich. 1983).
26. See Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 16.
27. See, e.g., Carson v. City of Prichard, 709 So. 2d 1199 (Ala. 1998) (sewage overflow into
residents' yards); Bonnot v. City of Jefferson City, 791 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (sewage
backed up into basements); Hafner & Sons, Inc. v. Cincinnati Metro. Sewer Dist., 694 N.E.2d Ill
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (two acres covered with raw sewage).
28. MILWAUKEE METRO. SEWERAGE DIST., MMSD RAINWATER REDUCTION EDUCATION
PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2000) [hereinafter FAQ'S].
29. Id.
30. MILWAUKEE METRO. SEWERAGE DIST., How RAINWATER ENTERS THE SANITARY SEWER
SYSTEM (2000).
31. Id.
32. FAQ'S, supra note 28, at 1. As the pamphlet succinctly puts it, "[k]eep the rainwater out of
the sewer to help keep the sewer out of your basement." Id.
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flows cause problems at treatment facilities that are not designed to
accommodate them.33
Eventually, the untreated sewage will back up through house laterals and
overflow into basements of low-lying homes. 34  To prevent this overflow,
many municipalities have created automatic overflow points.35  When
backups in the system reach a certain level, the untreated sewage overflows,
either at designated or undesignated points, into the surrounding environment
and local waterways.36 These backups can also be caused by electrical
failures at the treatment plant, vandalism, or other accidents and
emergencies.37 The EPA estimates that 40,000 of these SSOs occur each year
(an average of over 100 overflows per day).38
Scientific research involving the impact of SSOs on water quality is
ongoing.39 The EPA has identified many deleterious effects caused by SSOs,
including human exposure to bacteria, viruses, and other pathogens.4°
Environmental groups blame SSOs for degeneration of water quality, beach
closings, and many other deleterious environmental effects.4' States identify
the sewage treatment process as a pollution source that contributes to low
water quality.42 The EPA recently convened a special advisory committee to
delineate the specific health risks caused by SSOs. 43  It seems that most
concerned parties-states, the EPA, and environmental groups-agree that
SSOs are to be avoided whenever possible. This outlook should be kept in
mind during the discussion of the EPA's current regulatory scheme in Part III.
III. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW
Congress empowered the EPA to regulate SSOs as part of the Clean
33. MILWAUKEE METRO. SEWERAGE DIST., HOW THE SEWER SYSTEM WORKS (2000).
34. FAQ'S, supra note 28, at 1.
35. See, e.g., Dan Klepal, Sewer Deal May Hit $1 B[illion], CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 12,
2002, available at http://www.enquirer.com/editions/20O2/02/12/loc-sewer-dealmay_hit.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2003).
36. See generally Smith, supra note 23.
37. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 46.
38. See Smith, supra note 23. The EPA also has estimated that there are approximately 18,000
municipal sanitary sewer systems in the United States, serving about one-third of the nation's
population. Id.
39. Id
40. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 20.
41. See, e.g., Surfrider State of the Beach 2002, at
http://beach.com/stateofthebeach/water quality.asp?state=MI (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
42. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 21.
43. See UNITED STATES EPA, SUMMARY OF THE AUGUST 14-15, 2002, EXPERTS WORKSHOP
ON PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACTS OF SEWER OVERFLOWS, available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/expert workshopsummary.pdf (last visited June 29, 2003).
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Water Act's pollutant discharge permitting system. In the thirty years since
the EPA gained this power, though, observers have criticized the EPA's
discretionary enforcement decisions. Congress anticipated some of these
criticisms and incorporated corresponding safeguards into the CWA.
However, disagreements about enforcement decisions have led to the courts'
involvement, both by interpreting statutory and regulatory provisions and by
applying common law torts, such as nuisance and trespass, to the SSO
problem.
A. The Clean Water Act
Formal regulation of discharges from treatment facilities began with the
enactment of the CWA in 1972.44 By enacting the CWA, Congress intended
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."' 5 Congress attempted to accomplish this goal by outlawing
the discharge of pollutants to receiving waters without a permit.
46
Congress established that without a permit, the discharge of any
"pollutant" by any "person" is unlawfuIl, 47 and it included sewage in the
definition of a "pollutant. '48 SSOs fall under the heading of "point sources"
of pollutants. 49 Congress defined the term "person" to include individuals,
corporations, and municipalities, among others.50 Such "persons" may only
discharge pollutants, including sewage, when authorized to do so by a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit issued to
51the discharger by a regulatory agency.
Congress also mandated the establishment of water quality standards in
every state. 52 Responsible state regulatory agencies establish these standards,
typically indicating the maximum allowable total concentration of various
pollutants that can be detected in a water sample at any given time.
53
To ensure that these maximum pollutant concentrations are not exceeded,
regulatory agencies include corresponding limitations in all NPDES permits
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
45. Id. § 1251(a).
46. Id. § 1311(a).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 1362(6).
49. Id. § 1362(14) ("The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including... any pipe .... ). Id.
50. Id. § 1362(5).
51. Id. § 1342(a).
52. See generally id. § 1313.
53. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
2003]
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on concentrations of pollutants in discharges to the affected waters.54 Thus,
the regulatory agency's job is a complex and ever-changing one. In issuing
NPDES permits, the agency must consider both the quantity and quality of the
expected discharges from the permittee, as well as the quantity and quality of
discharges from other permitees discharging to the same body of water.
When permittees violate their permits, they are supposed to report the
violations to the EPA or the responsible state agency.55 Upon receiving notice
of the violation, the responsible agency decides whether to penalize the
violator or excuse the violation.56 Some have criticized the discretionary
nature of these decisions as leading to uneven enforcement.57
B. Enforcement Difficulties. Agency Discretion, Dual Jurisdiction, and
Agency Capture
Despite Congress' strongly pro-environmental language in the CWA, the
EPA and the state regulatory agencies have always dictated which violations
would be punished through discretionary enforcement of the law.
Congress embedded a system of dual jurisdictional authority within the
CWA, allowing both the states and the EPA to maintain some control over the
regulatory process. The individual states are allowed to set water quality
standards within their boundaries,58 and most states do so. 59 However, when
the EPA finds that a violation has occurred without corresponding corrective
action by the state agency charged with administering the state's version of
the NPDES, the EPA can initiate legal action sua sponte.60  This system of
dual jurisdictional authority has, at times, caused problems with the EPA and
54. See id. § 1342(a)(1).
55. 40 C.F.R § 122.41(m)(3) (2002).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (granting the EPA Administrator authority to administer the
CWA).
57. See, e.g., Bonner R. Cohen, Top EPA Official in New England Resigns, Heartland Institute,
available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=9876 (discussing uneven enforcement in
New England) (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(1-3).
59. State NPDES Program Authority, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/images/State NPDESProgAuth.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). Only
four states (Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska, and Idaho) do not have authority to administer their own
NPDES permit system. Id.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1). "Whenever... the Administrator finds that any person is in
violation of any condition or limitation which implements ... this title in a permit issued by a State
under... this title he shall proceed under his authority" to issue an order requiring compliance or to
initiate a civil action in federal district court. Id. The Administrator also has the option of simply
notifying the violator and the state of the violation. Id. If, after the notification, no action ensues




the states each waiting for the other to bring an enforcement action.61
Another difficulty in enforcing the CWA is agency "capture" by a
regulated industry. An industry "captures" a regulatory agency when, for all
practical purposes, the agency is under the control of the regulated industry.
This occurs in part because of the "myriad pressures and incentives that push
regulatory choices in the direction desired by regulated industry. 62
Many factors contribute to an industry's capture of an agency. The
agency's scarce resources can make it partially dependent on the regulated
industry for funding.63 Special interest groups funded by the industry can be
the "single, loud voice" the agency hears, pushing it in a certain direction.64 A
regulator's personal opinion on a particular situation may be the same as the
regulated industry's but contrary to a statutory or regulatory scheme.65 More
cynical analysts postulate that by making decisions favorable to regulated
industries, regulators may assure themselves cozy industry jobs after leaving
the agency.66
Perhaps as a result of the tendency toward capture, one observer's
research shows that environmental regulators prefer to informally bargain
with violators in order to reach agreement on future remedial actions rather
than pursue formal judicial enforcement of penalties for violations.67
In an internal memorandum dated April 27, 2000, the EPA's national
officials acted to limit the discretion exercised by the EPA's local officials by
issuing a new "Compliance and Enforcement Strategy" regarding both SSOs
and CSOs to its regional water management directors. 68  The regional
61. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION-LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 1009 (2000) (discussing Harmon Industries v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Harmon involved another important environmental statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"). RCRA regulates solid waste disposal. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2000). In Harmon, the
EPA filed a duplicate enforcement action against a violator already being prosecuted by a state
regulatory agency (known as "overfiling"). PERCIVAL, supra, at 1009. Percival notes that the
"EPA's inspector general issued a report finding widespread failures to enforce some of the basic
requirements of the environmental laws" on the part of the states. Id. NPDES permits issued to
some major dischargers were found to have been expired for over ten years. Id.
62. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture,
and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 108 (2002).
63. Id. at 109.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 108-09.
66. Id. at 110.
67. Id. at 83.
68. Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator, to EPA Regions I-X
Water Management Division Directors, et al. 10 (Apr. 27, 2000), available at
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/strat312.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter "EPA Memo"].
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directors were instructed to use "the full range of regulatory response options"
available to identify as many SSO locations as possible.69 Considering the
EPA estimates that 40,000 SSOs occur each year, this was no easy task.70 The
regions were further directed to attempt to eliminate twenty percent of the
worst SSO offenders each year.7' In identifying the twenty percent slated for
enforcement, the regional directors must consider such factors as receiving
water quality,72 environmental justice, 73 and beach closure areas. 74
In the memorandum, EPA officials also provided practical directives to
the various regions in selecting enforcement mechanisms. 75 The regions were
directed to use civil judicial actions with the objective of obtaining consent
decrees that included an enforceable schedule and required project milestones
to guarantee eventual compliance.76
In creating these consent decrees, courts have held that the EPA can
impose a so-called "sewer hook-up moratorium" on municipal violators,
meaning that no new connections to the sewer system will be allowed until
the bypass is eliminated.77 These moratoria can have a profound effect on the
economic health of a municipality, because if no new sewer hookups are
permitted, no new building development can take place. The memorandum
undoubtedly will help local EPA officials decide whether to enforce a NPDES
permit violation caused by an SSO.
Congress anticipated that the EPA might encounter problems in deciding
which violations to enforce and acted to limit the EPA's discretion in several
ways.
69. Id.
70. See Smith, supra note 23. Complicating the task even further is the fact that m6st SSOs do
not occur at well-documented locations; rather, the sewage simply bubbles up through surcharged
manholes or other points of free exit. See generally id.
71. EPA Memo, supra note 68, at 10.
72. Id.
73. Id. The environmental justice movement focuses on alleged "connections bctween
discrimination, poverty, and the distribution of environmental risks." PERCIVAL, supra note 61, at
20. See generally id. at 19-28. The movement generally asserts that those in poverty bear a greater
than warranted share of environmental risk. Id.
74. EPA Memo, supra note 68, at 10.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, 739 F. Supp. 278 (E.D.N.C. 1989). Another court held that such a
sewer moratorium did not constitute a regulatory "taking." Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Wash. Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369, 1382 (C.D. Md. 1975).
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C. Limits on Agency Discretion-Authorization of Citizen Suits and
Requirement of Standard NPDES Permit Conditions
1. Congressionally Imposed Limitations
Congress attempted to limit agency discretion in two ways: (1) By
building express limitations on agency discretion into the statutory language
of the CWA; and (2) By authorizing citizen suits to allow the public to
monitor the regulatory agencies' performance.
a. Express Statutory Limitations on Agency Discretion
An examination of the CWA, and most environmental statutes, indicates
that Congress recognized the danger of, and acted to prevent, agency
capture. 8 Congress limited the EPA's discretion by commanding that the
EPA "shall" initiate an enforcement action when it detects a violation.7 9 This
language, taken at face value, makes clear that the EPA really has no
discretion; whenever it detects a violation, it must initiate an enforcement
action. In reality, limited agency resources and enforcement costs dictate a
different outcome, as agency officials struggle to determine which violations
are worth prosecuting.80 Perhaps knowing that the EPA might encounter such
problems, Congress next acted to appoint the public at large as the ultimate
overseer over the EPA.
b. Congress's Authorization of Citizen Suits
Congress built another safeguard into the CWA by authorizing "citizen
suits. ' 81 Any citizen may sue "any other governmental instrumentality or
agency.., alleged to be in violation of... an effluent standard or
limitation., 82 Citizens may sue either the violator or the regulatory agency
perceived as failing to enforce a remedy for the violation.83 Though these
"citizen plaintiffs" have enjoyed some success, 4 courts have erected fairly
high hurdles to the courthouse door.8 5
78. For a discussion of agency capture, see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2000).
80. See supra Part III.B.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
82. Id.
83. Compare § 1365(a)(1), with § 1365(a)(2).
84. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md.
1987) (successful citizen plaintiff).
85. See generally Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (narrowing the circumstances under which citizen suits can be maintained under the CWA by
holding that citizens cannot maintain suits for wholly past violations of the CWA).
2003]
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Congress attempted to ensure uniform enforcement of the CWA through
these legislative measures. However, it is the EPA and the responsible state
agencies, not Congress, that oversee day-to-day enforcement of the statute.
To its credit, the EPA has attempted to standardize the regulatory programs of
the responsible state agencies by requiring that certain conditions be
incorporated into every NPDES permit.
86
2. EPA Imposed Limitations: Standard Permit Conditions
The EPA divides unplanned overflows into two categories: "bypasses"
and "upsets. 87 The EPA uses standard permit conditions to regulate these
unauthorized discharges from treatment facilities. 88 By incorporating these
standard permit conditions, the EPA limits the discretion that local
enforcement agencies enjoy. The standard permit conditions also are
important because in writing the newly proposed SSO standard permit
conditions, discussed in detail in Part IV, the EPA relied heavily on the
language used in the existing "bypass" and "upset" standard provisions.89
a. "Bypass" Standard NPDES Permit Condition
The EPA defines a "bypass" as "the intentional diversion of waste streams
from any portion of a treatment facility." 90  The EPA expressly prohibits
bypasses and may commence an enforcement action unless all three of the
following apply: 1) the bypass was "unavoidable to prevent loss of life,
personal injury, or severe property damage"; 2) there were "no feasible
alternatives" to the bypass; and 3) prompt notice of the bypass was submitted
to the permitting authority. 91
b. "Upset" Standard NPDES Permit Condition
The EPA defines an "upset," on the other hand, as "an exceptional
incident in which there is unintentional and temporary noncompliance
with... permit effluent limitations because of factors beyond the reasonable
control of the permittee. 9 2 A violator can maintain an affirmative defense to
prosecution for an upset if the violator can prove four things: 1) an upset
occurred; 2) the treatment facility was being properly operated at the time of
86. 40 C.F.R § 122.41 (2002). However, the states may modify the EPA's standard permit
conditions to be more stringent. Id. § 123.25.
87. Compare § 122.41(m), with § 122.41(n).
88. See id.
89. See infra Part IV.
90. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m)(1)(i).
91. Id. § 122.41(m)(4)(i)(A-C).
92. Id § 122.41(n)(1).
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the upset; 3) prompt notice was submitted to the regulatory authority; and 4)
Any necessary remedial measures were taken.93 Although the EPA allows
most states to administer their own NPDES permit programs, it limits the
authorized states' power by requiring that only the responsible state regulatory
agencies insert the bypass and upset provisions in every NPDES permit.
94
D. Judicial Interpretation of Standard Permit Conditions
Courts have construed the EPA's bypass and upset provisions narrowly.
Though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of SSOs, it has
endorsed the long-standing principle of interpretation that exceptions to a rule
are to be construed narrowly. 95
Federal district courts have construed the "bypass" and "upset" conditions
narrowly, taking note of the EPA's formal declaration that "[i]t must be
stressed that upsets are exception events which should occur infrequently.
The upset provision should not be construed as providing relief where there is
a pattern of permit violations. 96
A court prevented a municipality from successfully asserting the EPA
standard affirmative defenses in United States v. City of Toledo.97 The EPA
sued Toledo for alleged CWA violations stemming from the city's discharge
93. Id. § 122.41(n)(3). The Proposed Rule, discussed in Part IV, expressly states that its
framework is similar to this "upset" standard. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 167. The difference
between the Proposed Rule and the existing rule is that the Proposed Rule is broader to allow an
affirmative defense to enforcement actions when the discharge was caused by factors other than
severe natural conditions. Id.
94. Id. § 122.41. States that administer their own NPDES programs are also required to include
these conditions. Id. However, states can modify these standard conditions by making them more
stringent. Id. § 123.25; see also Mianus River Pres. Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir.
1976) (allowing states to modify federal CWA provisions to be more stringent). For example, some
states modify the EPA provisions prohibiting bypasses and upsets by omitting those portions
allowing affirmative defenses to violations. United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 118 F. Supp.
2d 615, 618 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (prohibiting violator from relying on the EPA's standard affirmative
defenses to bypass and upset because those affirmative defenses were omitted from the state permit);
see also Conn. Fund for Env't, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 1987) (noting that
failure to adopt the standard EPA permit affirmative defenses must be seen as a desire to adopt
stricter standards). Other states simply copy the EPA standard conditions verbatim. See, e.g., Pub.
Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 681 F. Supp. 237, 242-43
(admitting that violator's permit contained affirmative defense to bypass, but denying relief because
violator did not meet all conditions to qualify for an affirmative defense). At least one other state
statutorily mandates that its environmental agency may not impose any conditions regarding SSOs
that are more stringent than the EPA's. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.049 (Vernon 2000)
(prohibiting adoption of any SSO regulations stricter than the national requirements and requiring
state rules to employ the maximum flexibility allowed under national policy).
95. United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1932).
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 32,863 (June 7, 1979).
97. 63 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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of minimally treated wastewater during routine rainfall events.98 The city
discharged minimally treated wastewater through a bypass into a local
waterway. 99 The court characterized the issue as a pure question of law: The
meaning of the phrase "feasible alternatives" in the standard NPDES permit
condition involving bypasses. 100 Toledo argued that the phrase, "feasible
alternatives," did not contemplate the construction of new and/or expanded
treatment equipment, but was limited to feasibility with existing equipment. 1 '
The EPA, on the other hand, asked the court to find that the construction of
additional treatment capacity was indeed a "feasible alternative" under the
regulation. 10 2 The city argued that the EPA's interpretation of the exception
was "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" and that it was
inconsistent with prior agency decisions.10 3 The court first addressed the plain
language of the regulation and held the EPA's interpretation was amply
supported, noting that no language in the permit restricted feasibility to
existing facilities. 104 The court refused to insert such a restriction.'05
Next, the court considered the structure and context of the regulation as a
whole. 10 6 Toledo argued that the regulation's focus was simply operational,
dealing with existing facilities, not future ones.10 7 Again, the court disagreed.
After consulting, inter alia, the EPA's comments regarding the regulation in
question, the court found that "one focus of the bypass prohibition is to ensure
the constant operation of all existing equipment ... another focus is to avoid
any violations of permit effluent limitations.
'' 08
The court then embarked on an instructive discussion of applicable case
law. The court began by citing United States v. Weitzenhoff 109  In
Weitzenhoff the Third Circuit stated that the "EPA's interpretation of its
bypass regulation is entitled to considerable weight." 110  Next, the City of
Toledo court discussed four decisions from other federal district courts."'
98. Id. at 835.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 836.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 837. However, according to the court, the city provided no evidence of how the
EPA's interpretation was inconsistent with prior agency decisions. Id. at 839.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 837-38.
107. Id. at 838.
108. Id.
109. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 1288-89.
111. 63 F. Supp. 2d at 838-39 (citing United States v. Penn Hills, 6 F. Supp. 2d 432 (W.D. Pa.
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Although none of the four decisions were directly on point with the issues in
the case at bar, the court found that all were instructive because the courts
"prohibited the bypasses at issue and construed the bypass exception
narrowly."'"12  The City of Toledo court then followed suit, affirming the
EPA's narrow interpretation of the bypass exception to require the
construction of new treatment facilities for wet weather. 1
3
In another case, the court refused to allow a violator to rely on the
"bypass" or "upset" affirmative defense provisions of its permit because it
failed to meet the notice requirements of those defenses." 14  The court held
that the violator's five-day delay was enough to preclude application of the
defense, even though the delay occurred over a holiday weekend." 5 The same
court noted that, to be excusable, bypasses or upsets must qualify as
"exceptional" events not occurring time after time. 16
Another federal district court held that the likelihood of incurring huge
expenses will not support a finding of "technically infeasible" as required by
the bypass exception. 1
7
1998)); Save Our Bays & Beaches v. City & County of Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Haw.
1994); Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 716 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Town of
Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
112. City of Toledo, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 839. The facts in Penn Hills came the closest to
approximating the facts of City of Toledo. In Penn Hills, the district court concluded that
construction of additional treatment equipment was a "feasible alternative" to bypassing. Id. at 838
(citing Penn Hills, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 437). Toledo, in a straw-grasping attempt to distinguish Penn
Hills, noted that it was not stated in that case whether, as in the case at bar, the bypassing was
because of wet weather. Id. The Save Our Bays decision addressed "feasible alternatives" only in
the context of whether bypasses would be allowed during wet weather for repair and maintenance of
existing facilities. Id. at 838-39 (citing Save Our Bays, 904 F. Supp. at 1134-36). The city also tried
to distinguish this case, arguing that its principal focus was on the repair and maintenance aspects of
the bypass, not on the underlying cause of wet weather. Id. In the Sierra Club case, the district court
directly held that exceptions in a bypass prohibition could not justify repeated bypassing because of
constant wet weather. Id. at 839 (citing Union Oil Co., 716 F. Supp. at 434-37). However, the
bypass exception at issue in that case was not the standard EPA provision and did not contain a
"feasible alternatives" provision. Id. Thus, the Sierra Club court concluded that it did not directly
apply. Id. Finally, the Town of Lowell court concluded that bypasses were only authorized for
emergency situations and that frequent bypass occurrences because of lack of treatment capacity
were unallowable. Id. (citing Town of Lowell, 637 F. Supp. at 258). However, the Town of Lowell
case did not discuss the "feasible alternatives" issue and, therefore, did not directly address the facts
in City of Toledo. Id.
113. City of Toledo, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
114. Pub. Interest Research Group v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 681 F. Supp. 237
(D.N.J. 1987).
115. Id. at 243-44.
116. Id. at 244.
117. See, e.g., City of Mendota v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 549 N.E.2d 26, 28-30 (I11. App. Ct.
1990) (requiring the city to spend $14 million to eliminate all overflows, despite engineering firm's
suggested improvements of $1.6 million to reduce number of bypasses to only two or three per year).
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State courts construing similar state regulations have reached similar
results. In City of Mendota v. Illinois Pollution Control Board,118 Mendota
argued that the estimated spending of over fourteen million dollars to
eliminate sewage overflows in a community of only 7000 residents was
economically unreasonable." 9  The Illinois Pollution Control Board is
required by statute to take into account the "technical feasibility and economic
reasonableness" of reducing the overflows. 120 Despite this statutory directive,
the Board refused to grant the city an exception under the statute. 12 The court
affirmed the Board's decision, noting that "[i]t is apparent that the heart of the
city's argument is that technically feasible methods of preventing overflows
are economically unreasonable." 122 The court, like the Board and the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA") before it, rejected this argument,
noting that the city had not proposed sufficient alternative measures to the
complete fourteen million dollar system overhaul. 123  The court made its
findings even though the city presented data that the overflows caused little or
no adverse environmental impact. 124
In addition to being called on to interpret these regulatory provisions,
courts also have become involved in SSO disputes through an additional layer
of complexity inherent in the current regulatory scheme-tort suits. As a result
of these citizen suits authorized by Congress under the CWA,125 some courts
have shown a willingness to apply common law tort doctrines, such as
trespass and nuisance, to the SSO problem.
E. Common Law Enforcement and Remedies
Courts generally have held that municipalities are liable under the
common law doctrine of nuisance for property damage because of an SSO.126
In Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown,'27 the Illinois Court of Appeals held that
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act did not preclude a common law
nuisance action.' Tamalunis brought a nuisance suit against Georgetown for
118. 549 N.E.2d 26 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
119. Id. at 29.
120. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1987, ch. I 11 1/2, 1027) (current version at 415 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/27(a) (1997)).
121. Id. at28.
122. Id. at 29.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 29-30.
125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000); see also supra Part ll.C.I.b (discussing Congress's
authorization of citizen suits).
126. See, e.g., Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 542 N.E.2d 402 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 409.
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sewer overflows into a stream running across his property. 129  The court
affirmed the entry of a jury verdict totaling $150,000 in compensatory
damages. 30 Further, the court found that the plaintiffs could apply for further
relief in future actions if the overflows continued. 131
Other courts have determined that the common law negligence doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies to sewer overflow actions. 3 2 The doctrine relieves a
plaintiff from the burden of proving specific negligence on the part of the
defendant. 133 Negligence is inferred when "the accident causing the plaintiffs
physical harm is a type of accident that ordinarily happens because of the
negligence of the class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant
member."'134 However, the theory is incompatible with the use of specific
proof of negligence, because in such a case, a plaintiff would not need to rely
on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.1
35
In Bonnot v. City of Jefferson City,'3 6 the Missouri Court of Appeals held
that although res ipsa loquitur applied to the damage caused to plaintiffs
home by sewer overflows, the plaintiff, in effect, proved too much to rely on
the doctrine. 137 The plaintiff in Bonnot showed through expert testimony that
the overflows would not have occurred if the city had performed regular
maintenance on the sewer line.'3 8 The court held that this was enough to deny
submission of the case to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur theory.' 39
Violators have argued that SSOs caused by "extreme" wet-weather events
"cannot be realistically engineered against.' 140  Some courts have accepted
this principle. 14 1 However, some courts have also rejected this defense in the
case in which backups "are the result not of 'one-hundred-year rains' but of
mere annual precipitation."
142
129. Id. at 404.
130. Id. at414.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 38 11. Ct. Cl. 185 (1986) (holding that the application of res
ipsa loquitur was appropriate when the claimant's land had not flooded prior to the city's removal of
a nearby diversion structure but did flood thereafter).
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
134. Id. § 17.
135. Id. § 17 cmt. g.
136. 791 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 769-70.
139. Id.
140. Hafner & Sons, Inc. v. Cincinnati Metro. Sewer Dist., 694 N.E.2d 111, 114 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997).
141. See id. (implying that a violator might be excused for a violation caused by an extreme,
wet-weather event).
142. Id. The distinction between overflows caused by annually occurring rains and overflows
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The current regulatory scheme consists of a hodgepodge of statutory
directives in the CWA, permit provisions required by the EPA, discretionary
enforcement by the EPA and state agencies, citizen suits, and court-imposed
common law remedies. The EPA attempted to provide some clarity to the
situation when it proposed a new rule for the regulation of SSOs in early
2001.
IV. THE EPA'S PROPOSED RULE
On January 4, 2001, the EPA issued a draft notice of proposed rulemaking
for a new rule regulating SSOs. 143 On January 20, 2001, the draft notice was
withdrawn from the Office of the Federal Register pursuant to a memorandum
issued by the White House. 144 In the memorandum, newly-inaugurated
President George W. Bush directed all administrative agencies to withdraw all
pending documents for review by his newly appointed agency heads. 145 In
November 2001, after the appropriate review by the new Administrator, the
EPA announced its intent to issue a new draft notice of proposed rulemaking
that contained the same regulatory language as the original draft notice.
146
Thus, for the purposes of this Comment, the original draft notice and the
anticipated forthcoming draft notice will be treated as identical. The new
draft notice was expected to appear in the Federal Register in 2003.147 As of
this writing, 148 the reissued draft notice has not yet appeared. The draft notice
is a far-reaching document containing a wealth of information about SSOs.
14 9
The draft notice, citing ambiguity in the field, first gives the official EPA
definition of an SSO.
A. SSO Definition
According to the EPA, any discharges of untreated wastewater qualify as
SSOs, regardless of whether the discharges reach the waters of the United
States. 150  Backups of wastewater into buildings, including homes, also
caused by rains that occur only once per hundred years forms the basis of the author's recommended
reforms to the EPA's Proposed Rule discussed infra in Part VI.




146. Id. The revised notice will, however, contain a summary of public comment received on
the original draft notice. Id
147. Id.
148. June 24, 2003.
149. See generally Proposed Rule, supra note 1. For example, the Proposed Rule discusses the
definition of SSOs, the major causes of SSOs, and associated health and environmental risks. Id.
150. Id. at 80.
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qualify as SSOs, unless such backups are caused by problems within the
building lateral, not the main sewer line.1 5 1 The EPA cites the deteriorating
condition of the nation's sanitary sewer infrastructure and the rising number
of SSOs as reasons to support the increased governmental oversight asserted
by the Proposed Rule. 152 The crux of the Proposed Rule is the promulgation
of three new "standard permit conditions" to be contained in all future
NPDES permits. 53 The second of these three required conditions imposes a
general prohibition on SSOs, subject to a laundry-list of exceptions.
154
B. Proposed Standard NPDES Permit Conditions
The three proposed general NPDES permit conditions are: 1) agreement
of the permit holder to establish a "capacity, management, operation and
maintenance" ("CMOM") plan for the sewage collection system; 155 2) a
prohibition on any discharge from the collection system prior to the treatment
facility (i.e., SSO), subject to certain defenses for "unavoidable discharges";
and 3) reporting, public notification, and recordkeeping requirements for all
SSO occurrences.
156
As noted, one of the EPA's proposed general permit conditions is a
general prohibition on SSOs. However, the Proposed Rule eviscerates this
prohibition by allowing a variety of affirmative defenses to enforcement
actions aimed at punishing violators. As discussed later in this Comment,
157
the available defenses are so broad that the practical effect of the Proposed
Rule will be minimal, and the current situation will be close to unchanged.
58
Further, the rule states that the EPA may be persuaded to allow additional
unpunished violations through the use of its enforcement discretion. 1
59
The EPA divides the affirmative defenses allowed by the draft notice into
two categories: 1) defenses to overflow violations caused by "severe natural
conditions"; 160 and 2) defenses to overflow violations caused by "factors other
151. Id.
152. Id. at 25.
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id. at 165-68; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing proposed standard NPDES permit
conditions).
155. The CMOM program would include such measures as emergency overflow response
procedures, a sewer system evaluation and capacity plan, and documentation requirements. Id. at 87-
88.
156. ld. at 77.
157. See infra Part V1.
158. See id.
159. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 150.
160. Id. at 165.
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than severe natural conditions.' 16' A defense to a violation caused by severe
natural conditions requires three components: 1) the violation was caused by a
condition such as "hurricanes, tornados, widespread flooding, earthquakes,
[or] tsunamis"; 2) there were "no feasible alternatives"'162 to the violation; and
3) the defense was submitted to the NPDES or local authority within ten days
of the discharge. 63 This definition seems to exclude overflows caused by
heavy rainfall events, which, as discussed earlier in this Comment, are among
the most common causes of SSOs. 164  The occurrence of the exemplary
"severe natural conditions" listed by the draft notice is so uncommon that this
exception would probably be of little use.
The second defense, "factors other than severe natural conditions," would
probably be employed much more frequently. A violator asserting this
defense must prove the following to avoid liability: 1) the violator identified
the cause of the overflow; 2) the discharge was "exceptional, unintentional,
temporary and caused by factors beyond the reasonable control of the
permittee"; 165 3) the discharge could not have been prevented by the exercise
of "reasonable control"; 166 4) the defense was submitted to the NPDES or
local authority within ten days of the discharge; and 5) the violator took "all
reasonable steps to stop, and mitigate the impact of, the discharge as soon as
possible."'
167
The EPA stated that the proposed framework for affirmative defenses is
similar to the existing standard NPDES permit condition for "upset," with the
difference being that the new approach provides for affirmative defenses to




Of course, even under the proposed framework, the EPA could still
simply decline to prosecute the violation. Such a decision would fall within
the discretionary enforcement power enjoyed by the various EPA regions.
161. Id. at 167. Presumably, these defenses would replace the existing affirmative defenses
available for bypasses and upsets.
162. Id. at 165. Feasible alternatives might include such measures as retention of untreated
wastewater, reduction of infiltration and inflow of stormwater, or use of emergency treatment
equipment. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra Part I.B.






Uneven enforcement is one of the major criticisms of the existing regime and
will be one of the major criticisms of the proposed regime. Part VI of this
Comment proposes a discretion-reducing standard permit condition that
would help remedy this problem.
D. Dej Vu All Over Again?
At this point, it may be appropriate to pose a question: What exactly will
have changed after the promulgation of the new rule? 169 If anything, the new
proposed standard conditions appear to allow a broader range of affirmative
defenses than do the existing standard conditions. The new approach makes a
defense to an SSO caused by factors "beyond the reasonable control of the
permittee" available even if the SSO was not caused by severe natural
conditions.'"0 No exact data on the cause of SSOs exists. However, it is
widely believed that one of the most common causes of SSOs is extreme
rainfall leading to wet weather inflow and infiltration into sanitary sewers.17
1
In fact, in the Proposed Rule, this is the very first cause of SSOs discussed by
the EPA. Yet, it seems that an SSO caused by such a wet-weather event
would be subject to the affirmative defense envisioned by the standard permit
condition as a factor "beyond the reasonable control of the permittee." It is
instructive to apply the Proposed Rule standard condition to a situation in
which an SSO was caused by an extreme rainfall event.
Such a rainfall would probably not qualify as a "severe natural condition"
as defined by the first general permit condition-for example, earthquakes,
tsunamis, and hurricanes. Thus, a violator's defense to an enforcement action
after an SSO caused by a wet-weather event would fall under the second
general permit condition, a defense utilizing "factors other than severe natural
conditions.' 73 As discussed above, under this defense, a violator must prove
the following to avoid liability: 1) the violator identified the cause of the
overflow; 2) the discharge was "exceptional, unintentional, temporary and
caused by factors beyond the reasonable control of the permittee"; 3) "the
discharge could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable
control"; 4) the defense was submitted to the NPDES or local authority within
ten days of the discharge; 5) the violator took "all reasonable steps to stop,
169. See infra Part V for a discussion of how Cincinnati's experience would have been no
different under the Proposed Rule.
170. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 167.
171. See, e.g., FAQ'S, supra note 28.
172. Proposed Rule, supra note I, at 39. The Proposed Rule lists "[p]eak flows that exceed
system capacity" as the first cause of SSOs. Id. It later states that these peak flows generally occur
during wet-weather events. Id. at 40.
173. See supra note 161.
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and mitigate the impact of, the discharge as soon as possible."' 174
A consistent overflow violator could satisfy these five conditions fairly
easily and, therefore, could successfully mount an affirmative defense to
prosecution for the violation. Yet, in the introduction to the Proposed Rule,
the EPA claims that the proposed modifications will result in a reduction of
SSO occurrences and an improvement of treatment facility performance.
75
This conclusion does not follow from a careful analysis of the change made
by the Proposed Rule-a broadening of the potential for affirmative defenses.
Additionally, the Proposed Rule does not aid the goal of uniform
enforcement. It provides no yardstick to assist regulatory agencies in deciding
which violations to prosecute with the limited resources available., 76 The
EPA defends its proposal in part by identifying discussions in which many
municipalities indicated that they believed that eliminating all SSOs was
impossible. 177 The municipalities suggested a need for "a workable regulatory
framework which... define[s] compliance endpoints in a manner that [is]
consistent with engineering realities and the health and environmental risks of
SSOs.' 78 Certainly, the EPA must reach a compromise between violators that
desire less regulation and environmental groups that desire the complete
elimination of SSOs. The Proposed Rule's broad exceptions seem to be a
clear victory for the municipalities that violate the SSO prohibition.
Cincinnati, Ohio has become embroiled in a controversy over its SSO
problem-a controversy partly caused by the inadequacy of the current
regulatory scheme. Part V of this Comment will explore this problem and
show that the Proposed Rule would not have led to a smoother resolution of
the situation.
V. CASE STUDY: CINCINNATI, OHIO
The contentious events in Cincinnati, Ohio illustrate the problems often
encountered when a municipality tries to address its SSO problems under the
current regulatory scheme. The Metropolitan Sewerage District of Greater
Cincinnati ("MSDGC") identified over one hundred overflow points within its
sanitary sewer system. 17 9 During wet weather, Cincinnati's sewer system is
unable to handle the increased flow, and these bypasses overflow millions of
174. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 167.
175. Id. at 2.
176. See infra Part VI for a proposal of how this yardstick assistance might be provided to
agencies.
177. Proposed Rule, supra note I, at 27.
178. Id.
179. Klepal, supra note 35.
[87:225
SANITARY SEWER OVERFLOWS
gallons of untreated or partially treated sewage to the environment. 180  The
worst of these, known as the SSO 700, overflows more than forty times per
year, pouring an estimated sixty-one million gallons of completely or partially
untreated sewage into the east branch of Cincinnati's Mill Creek. 181 Local
environmental groups had long lobbied for enforcement action against
MSDGC, and the EPA obliged with a complaint filed in 1992.182 Negotiations
toward a consent decree 183 began in 1996.184 Six years later, the consent
decree was finalized and announced in February 2002.185
The consent decree, hailed in some quarters and disparaged in others, is
eighty-four pages long and imposes various requirements on the city of
Cincinnati, Hamilton County, and MSDGC. 186  One of the first items
addressed is SSO 700. The decree mandates a two-step approach to solving
the worst problem in the system. First, Cincinnati must construct a small
treatment facility at the SSO 700 location to improve the quality of discharges
from that overflow while more permanent solutions are being studied. I8 7 The
city must spend ten to fifteen million dollars on the interim treatment facility
and complete construction of the facility by 2007.188 No final solution is
mandated. However, one approach that is suggested for study is the
construction of a "deep tunnel" that would store would-be overflow sewage
during a rainstorm and then release it slowly during the following days at a
rate that the existing sanitary system can handle. 189 The city must propose a
plan for the permanent solution by 2009.190 If the tunnel solution is chosen,
the city must complete construction by 2016.191 If the city chooses another
solution, the city must complete construction by 2022.192
The city must also take other corrective action. In addition to the work
required on SSO 700, the city must also fix sixteen other overflow points
believed to be among the most environmentally harmful.193 The city must
180. Id.
181. Fixing Sewers, supra note 13.
182. Garretson, supra note 12.
183. A consent decree is an order of the court that is agreed to by all concerned parties.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed. 1999).
184. Garretson, supra note 12.
185. See Fixing Sewers, supra note 13.
186. See generally Consent Decree, supra note 9.
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id. at 19.
189. Id. at 13, 22.
190. Id. at 22.
191. Id. at 23.
192. Id.
193. Fixing Sewers, supra note 13.
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also prepare a comprehensive plan with the goal of eventually eliminating all
SSOs. 194  The elements of the plan include data collection and modeling,
analysis and assessment, and implementation.1 95 The decree specifically notes
that it mandates no specific date by which construction on all SSOs must be
completed; however, the city must propose such date in a plan submitted to
the EPA. 1
96
The decree also contains two major economic measures intended to spur
the city along in meeting these objectives. First, the city must impose a sewer
hookup moratorium' 97 -it can authorize no new connections to the sanitary
sewer system that might aggravate downstream conditions, causing new SSOs
or contributing to existing SSOs. 98 By forbidding connections to the sewer
system, the decree seriously curtails potential development, and the economic
benefits that follow, within the city. Second, the decree mandates a schedule
of fines for noncompliance with any of its provisions.'99
Both the EPA and the city hailed the decree as a victory, claiming that the
settlement reached was best for the city and the environment. However, the
local Sierra Club200 does not agree. On February 27, 2002, the Sierra Club
filed a lawsuit in federal court, alleging that the decree was inadequate
because, among other things: 1) it does not address all known SSOs in the
city; 2) it provides no civil penalties for past violations; 3) it does not address
the city's combined sewer overflows; 4) the time allowed for public review of
and comment on the decree was inadequate; and 5) the time allowed for the
city to address the SSO problem was too long.20'
The Cincinnati controversy, especially the suit filed by the Sierra Club,
illustrates the deficiencies some feel are inherent in the existing body of SSO
regulatory law. First, the EPA used its enforcement discretion to decline to
initiate action against the city for years, allowing the SSO problem to continue
unabated.20 2 Even after the EPA decided to prosecute the city's violations, six
years passed until the parties reached an agreement on a consent decree.
Second, the substance of the proposed solution is at least partially
194. Consent Decree, supra note 9, at 27.
195. Id. at 28.
196. Id. at 36.
197. Id. at 38. As noted supra in Part 1IlD, courts have held that the EPA has the authority to
order such a moratorium.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 45. The city will be fined $1500 per day for days 1-30 of noncompliance, $3000 per
day for days 31-60 of noncompliance, and $5000 per day over 60 days of noncompliance. Id.
200. See supra note 11.
201. Horn, supra note 15.
202. See Sierra Club Takes on Metropolitan Sewer District, available at
http://ohio.sierraclub.org/miami/issues/waterquality (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
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unsatisfactory in that it does not address all, or even most, of Cincinnati's
SSOs. 20
3
The Proposed Rule would fare no better. It would not require the EPA to
initiate an enforcement proceeding at any point, and it would not require the
elimination of all SSOs in a settlement. If anything, it would provide
violators with a broader range of affirmative defenses.2 °4 Part VI of this
Comment discusses modifications that the EPA could make to the Proposed
Rule to alleviate some of these problems.
VI. A PATH TO UNIFORMITY-PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE
PROPOSED RULE
As everyone involved seems to agree, it is impossible to prevent all SSOs.
On the other hand, the health and property risks involved make it imperative
to prevent as many SSOs as possible. The EPA repeatedly has fought for a
narrow interpretation of the standard "bypass" and "upset" provisions inserted
into every NPDES permit, and the courts generally have agreed with the
EPA's construction. 0 5 However, in the new rule, the EPA inexplicably
broadens the available defenses for violators. Soon, the EPA will request
notice and comment on its new rule dealing with SSOs. If it does not amend
the rule from its current form, it is letting a golden opportunity slip through its
fingers.
When it re-promulgates the Proposed Rule, the EPA would be wise to
follow the lead of the courts and the engineering industry. Instead of skirting
the issue of rainfall-induced SSOs with its currently proposed five-part
requirement for overflow exceptions and distinctions between "severe natural
conditions" and "factors beyond the reasonable control of the permittee," the
EPA should flex its regulatory muscle and promulgate a standard NPDES
permit condition that directly addresses SSOs caused by wet weather in
relation to the intensity of the rainfall event.
The EPA's proposed framework for dealing with the SSO problem is
inadequate because it will effect only a negligible change in the current
unsatisfactory situation of uneven, discretionary enforcement. While the EPA
has withdrawn the Proposed Rule for further review, it should remedy these
deficiencies. It could do so by providing a uniform method to evaluate SSO
violations occurring because of severe rainfall events, the leading cause of
SSOs.
The basis for such a solution lies in the reliability of data accumulated
203. Id.
204. See supra Part IV.D.
205. See supra Part II1.D.
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over more than a century relating to precipitation intensity. Engineers
generally characterize the severity of a rainfall as an "X-year storm event.
20 6
For example, a rainfall of such intensity that, on the average, it occurs only
once every ten years is called a "ten-year storm event. '207 Over the years,
civil and environmental engineers have established reliable estimates for
everything from one-year storm events to one hundred-year storm events for
every part of the United States based on statistical analysis of precipitation. 8
The EPA admits that wet weather is one of the leading causes of SSOs.
2 0 9
It should add a standard NPDES permit condition addressing SSOs caused by
wet weather, with the standard expressly tied to the intensity of the bypass-
causing wet-weather event. Perhaps a violator could be excused for bypasses
caused by a ten-year rainfall event or a twenty-year rainfall event; the exact
level of regulation would be the EPA's to determine based on its applicable
agency expertise. The establishment of such a concrete standard would take
the guesswork out of enforcement and make the job of the EPA's enforcement
team much easier. Rainfall amounts could simply be measured at local rain
gauges and compared against well-established, benchmark weather data. If
the storm was more intense than the allowable limit specified in the permit,
regulators would excuse the bypass. If it were not, regulators would prosecute
the bypass.
At least one state has already discovered and implemented this solution.
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 210 the court
analyzed an affirmative defense provision that stated: "Bypassing... is
prohibited; except when the precipitation event exceeds 5.1 inches in 24 hours
as measured by the rain gauge located at No. 2 High Head Pumping
Station."21' The court simply inspected the rain gauge records, ascertained
that the rainfall on the bypass dates had not exceed 5.1 inches, and concluded
that the affirmative defense was unavailable to the violator.212
Other courts, speaking without enjoying the benefit of a specific rainfall
benchmark such as the one in the Chesapeake Bay case, have noted that a
206. See generally http://www.severityindex.comi/papcr/hsi.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
207. Id. This terminology can sometimes be confusing; a "10-year event" is a storm that, based
on average probabilities, will return once every ten years. Id. Thus, by chance, a "10-year storm"
could occur more or less than once within a single ten-year period. Id.
208. See generally MACKENZIE DAVIS & DAVID CORNWELL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
58-59 (3d ed. 1998). The Surgeon General of the Army was the first to record precipitation
measurements in 1819. Id. at 59 n.8.
209. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 40.





municipality experiencing overflows after a one hundred-year storm event has
a legitimate excuse, while a municipality that bypasses after a one-year storm
event does not.21 3
The EPA should find the ease with which the Chesapeake Bay court
analyzed the permit at issue in that case instructive. Because the permit
contained a specific rainfall amount, above which bypasses would be excused,
the court had no difficulty in resolving the dispute after a simple inspection of
the rain gauge records. If the EPA adopted a similar approach, it would make
214the lives of its own regulatory officials much easier. The regulatory
officials, like the Chesapeake Bay court, could simply inspect the permit and
the rain gauge records, and know instantly whether the violation could be
excused or not. By using this method, the EPA could save enormous amounts
of time and money spent by its officials in determining whether to prosecute a
particular bypass.
Two potential objections to this proposal exist. First, it could be argued
that this proposal leaves the EPA's power of discretionary enforcement intact,
and thus will have little effect on the reality of everyday enforcement. It is
indisputable that the EPA's discretion will remain. However, the addition of
the standard permit condition will provide more of a bright-line rule to assist
the EPA's enforcers. Perfectly uniform enforcement will probably never be
attained, and, as discussed below in the response to the second objection, may
not always be desired. The proposal will also provide something for citizen
and environmental groups to point to when attempting to enforce CWA
provisions through a citizen suit.
Second, opponents might complain that the proposal does not take a cost-
benefit analysis into account. It might require violators to undertake costly
repairs to prevent SSOs that cause little or no environmental damage.
However, courts have already rejected such cost-based arguments. 21 5 Further,
as already conceded, the EPA and the responsible state agencies will still have
213. Hafner & Sons, Inc. v. Cincinnati Metro. Sewer Dist., 694 N.E.2d 111, 114 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997).
214. In the Proposed Rule, the EPA notes in passing that permit violations could be "judged
according to the severity of the natural condition coincident with the discharge." Proposed Rule,
supra note 1, at 153. However, the EPA never mentions this excellent idea again in the Proposed
Rule and clearly does not incorporate it within its proposed standard permit conditions. Further, it
seems clear that a rainfall event would not fall within the EPA's definition of a "severe natural
condition." See Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 165 (citing "hurricanes, tornados, widespread
flooding, earthquakes, [and] tsunamis" as examples of "severe natural conditions"). This passing
reference must therefore refer to judging violations according to the severity of the natural
occurrence that caused an SSO.
215. See City of Mendota v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 549 N.E.2d 26 (111. App. Ct. 1990),
discussed supra at notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
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enforcement discretion. If municipalities contend that no environmental
damage occurred as a result of an SSO, these agencies could still decline to
enforce the violation. If a citizen or environmental group contests that
decision, the agency-and potentially a court-will have a decision to make.
The proposed permit condition will merely provide a standard for the court to
apply.
Hopefully, the increased likelihood of punishment for frequent overflows
would spur violators to remedial action. But until the EPA promulgates such
a definite standard and consistently punishes violators, the victims of
overflow related damage will greet the sight of gathering rain clouds with
dread, and they will be left wondering: How much raw sewage will be
deposited on their property or in a local waterway this time? The problem is
one of national significance, and the EPA should treat it as such by
promulgating and enforcing a standard NPDES permit condition that outlaws
overflows after all but the most infrequent storm events.
DAVID STRIFLING*
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